THE IRAN–U.S. CONFRONTATION WON’T START IN IRAN — AND ISRAEL MAY FACE STRONG INCENTIVES TO MOVE FIRST

 

The coming confrontation between Iran and the United States is often framed as a binary moment: Washington acts or holds back; Tehran retaliates or absorbs the pressure. This framing is simple, accessible, and largely misleading. If escalation occurs, it is unlikely to unfold as a conventional state-to-state conflict, and it is unlikely to begin where many observers expect. Instead, escalation would most likely emerge as a system-level event—an activation of Iran’s regional proxy architecture—designed to distribute risk, externalize damage, and preserve regime survival. Within that system, Israel is not a peripheral actor but a forward pressure point where consequences are most likely to manifest first.

As the region moved into late December and early January, intelligence indicators suggested that Israel was preparing for a significant military campaign in southern Lebanon, extending south of the Litani River and potentially beyond it. According to this assessment, the campaign was designed primarily as an air operation, with the objective of decisively degrading Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and reducing the threat in a way Israel has not previously attempted. This prospective operation was widely discussed across public media channels and was understood to have substantial American backing, with even President Donald Trump making public remarks that reinforced the perception that Washington was aligned with Israel’s intent to constrain Hezbollah.

The central question at this stage is not merely whether the United States will strike Iran. The more consequential question is how Iran would respond if it assessed that American pressure was shifting from deterrence toward something that threatens the regime itself. Iran’s leadership has spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario. Its regional network of proxies exists to impose costs without absorbing full attribution, to escalate without crossing clear red lines, and to complicate the decision-making of adversaries. When regime survival becomes the overriding priority, this architecture moves from being a strategic option to a strategic necessity.

As this operational window approached, internal developments inside Iran introduced a destabilizing variable. Large-scale demonstrations broke out, becoming increasingly hostile toward the regime. Public messaging from the United States escalated in parallel, with explicit warnings that if Iranian authorities continued killing their own citizens, American involvement or support for the protest movement could follow in one form or another. Whether or not such unrest is sufficient to threaten regime survival in objective terms, leadership perception—rather than collapse metrics—is what matters most in escalation decisions. This convergence of internal unrest and external pressure materially altered the strategic environment, injecting regime-survival dynamics into what might otherwise have remained a contained regional escalation.

At the core of Iran’s regional system sits Hezbollah. It is not simply another proxy but Iran’s primary strategic deterrent against Israel and its most significant escalation lever. Iraqi Shiite militias serve a different function, providing deniable pressure against U.S. forces, logistics, and diplomatic presence across the region. The Houthis represent another layer, one capable of disrupting global commerce, maritime confidence, and energy psychology far from Iran’s borders. Iran itself remains the core asset—the element Tehran will protect above all others, even if doing so comes at the expense of its regional partners. This system exists to give Iran options short of direct war while preserving an escalation ladder if leadership believes its position is becoming untenable.

In the broader strategic background, this assessment incorporates a critical energy-security context: the partial reintegration of Venezuelan oil into global markets through U.S.-authorized licensing arrangements. Under these frameworks, tens of millions of barrels of Venezuelan oil have been exported or earmarked for export to the United States in recent periods. While this does not represent regime change or political transformation in Venezuela, it is interpreted here as a strategic effort to increase supply flexibility and mitigate potential energy shocks in anticipation of heightened Middle East instability.

This energy dimension is central to the Iranian response calculus. If Iranian leadership perceives that regime collapse is imminent, the expectation within this assessment is that Iran would escalate aggressively across multiple vectors. This would include attacks on American assets throughout the region, coordinated pressure against allies such as Israel, and actions designed to disrupt global energy flows. In particular, the Strait of Hormuz represents one of Iran’s most consequential pressure points. Energy agencies estimate that roughly 20 million barrels per day—about one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption—transit the strait. Severe disruption would therefore have immediate global economic consequences. While full closure would be extraordinarily costly for Iran, even partial interference could generate sharp price volatility and international pressure for de-escalation.

Within this context, it is assessed that the United States has, at various points, prepared for direct action against Iran. Public reporting and retrospective accounts indicate that President Trump previously authorized—and then halted—a planned strike shortly before execution. This episode is not interpreted as abandonment of intent, but as a tactical pause, likely driven by timing, sequencing, and coordination considerations rather than a change in strategic direction.

Against this backdrop, a central analytical question emerges: would Iran choose to attack Israel preemptively, and what would it gain by doing so? From this perspective, Iran gains little from a direct first strike on Israel. Any such attack would be met with overwhelming Israeli retaliation that would devastate Iranian military assets. While Iran might succeed in striking a limited number of targets, the majority of incoming threats would likely be intercepted.

Israel’s defensive posture is assessed here as exceptionally robust. It includes emerging, limited-deployment laser-based air-defense capabilities commonly referred to as Iron Beam, Israel’s Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 systems, and a substantial U.S. missile-defense surge. That American contribution includes two deployed THAAD batteries, additional Patriot systems and interceptor stockpiles, expanded radar and sensor assets, and regional naval ballistic-missile-defense coverage provided by U.S. forces. Collectively, these deployments represent one of the most significant U.S. missile-defense surges to Israel in recent decades.

Because of this defensive reality, Iran is assessed as unlikely to initiate a direct Israel–Iran exchange absent extreme provocation. Conversely, Israel is also assessed as unwilling to strike Iran directly at this stage, because doing so would hand Tehran exactly what it needs: a justification to redirect internal unrest outward, unify the population against an external enemy, and suppress domestic dissent under wartime conditions. From this perspective, Israel is deliberately avoiding a direct Iran confrontation, despite its military capability to strike.

At the same time, Iran has issued threats that if Israel proceeds with an operation against Iran, Tehran would formally enter the conflict in direct support of Hezbollah. This threat creates a strategic trap. Israel cannot execute a full-scale offensive against Hezbollah without risking Iranian entry into the war, and Israel cannot strike Iran without providing the regime with a narrative lifeline. This mutual constraint produces a temporary strategic stalemate.

Within this stalemate, the United States is assessed as holding strong intent to apply military pressure against Iran, with specific targets already mapped and objectives that may include severely degrading regime capabilities or materially supporting internal pressure. This dynamic makes coordination between Washington and Jerusalem critical. If the United States strikes Iran unilaterally, Hezbollah’s financial and logistical lifeline would be placed in immediate jeopardy. In this model, Hezbollah is assessed as being able to sustain operations only for a relatively short period absent Iranian backing, after which its operational capacity would degrade sharply. Anticipating this, Hezbollah would be expected to escalate rapidly rather than risk gradual strangulation.

For this reason, close U.S.–Israel coordination is assessed as essential. This model assumes that the United States would provide Israel with a narrow warning window—minutes or hours—prior to striking Iran. That window would be sufficient for Israel to initiate a large-scale preemptive attack against Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon, from north to south, with the goal of degrading launch capacity, command nodes, and logistical networks before Hezbollah could execute a massive retaliatory barrage on Iran’s behalf.

Under this sequence, Israel’s role would be to focus on its immediate regional threats—Hezbollah and potentially the Houthis—while the United States concentrates on Iran itself. Iran, facing an existential threat, would simultaneously direct available assets toward self-preservation, including attacks on American positions in the region and potentially secondary pressure on Israel. Houthi involvement is assessed as highly likely, particularly in maritime and long-range harassment roles designed to expand the conflict’s economic and psychological footprint.

Within this framework, the most likely opening move is not Iran striking Israel directly, but Israel concluding that preemption against Hezbollah represents its least risky option. This could follow an American strike on Iran or occur almost simultaneously with it. Whether the United States moves first or Israel moves first is assessed as less important than the simultaneity of action, which serves to blur attribution, reduce diplomatic blame concentration, and force adversaries to focus on immediate operational survival rather than narrative control.

This sequencing aligns with the observable regional military buildup that has been taking place, which is assessed here as preparatory rather than reactive. Force movements, air-defense deployments, and posture adjustments are interpreted within this model as consistent with a coordinated, multi-theater contingency plan rather than isolated defensive measures.

Taken together, this assessment views the coming confrontation not as a single war but as a tightly coupled sequence of actions across multiple fronts, driven primarily by regime-survival logic in Tehran and deterrence-enforcement logic in Washington and Jerusalem. The danger lies not in any one strike, but in the activation of an entire system designed to distribute violence rapidly and overwhelm decision-making cycles.

This environment creates a high risk of miscalculation. The United States may interpret calibrated pressure as a controlled signal. Iran may interpret the same pressure as regime-ending intent. Hezbollah may read ambiguity as permission. Israel may read proxy mobilization as an imminent launch window. Escalation, under these conditions, emerges not from a single decision but from overlapping assumptions.

Indicators of direction are therefore more important than rhetoric. Changes in Hezbollah’s operational posture, unusual command activity, shifts in U.S. logistical preparation, sustained militia pressure in Iraq, intensified Houthi maritime actions, and changes in Iranian domestic messaging provide clearer insight into trajectory than headline statements. These signals indicate whether Tehran believes it is engaged in a routine confrontation or approaching an endgame.

The most dangerous moment in crises of this nature is often when all actors believe escalation remains under control. Systems designed to distribute violence across multiple fronts can escape control rapidly once activated. The coming period may represent the final phase in which outcomes are shaped primarily by deliberate choice rather than momentum. If the United States acts, Iran is unlikely to respond where Washington expects. If Iran responds, it will do so through instruments designed to raise costs without inviting a direct knockout blow. If those instruments activate, Israel may have only one rational option: reduce the threat before it materializes.

This assessment is not intended as alarmism but as an effort to clarify the strategic logic at play. The greatest danger is not a single strike, but a region in which every actor believes the first move will be survivable—until subsequent moves prove otherwise.